01489cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008580 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451949094 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Soft Budget Constraints, Firm Commitments and the Social Safety Net. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1991. 1 online resource (26 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students It is shown that the inefficiencies created by the 'soft' budget constraint, enjoyed by enterprises in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, will continue so long as governments are unable credibly to threaten not to bail out loss-makers. Commitment to a 'hard' budget constraint can best be achieved by the institution of a suitable social safety net. The burden on the social safety net can be reduced by the (endogenous) development of financial markets. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1991/098 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1991/098/001.1991.issue-098-en.xml IMF e-Library