02187cas a2200325 a 4500 AALejournalIMF009441 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451867299 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Vardy, Felix. On the Buyability of Voting Bodies / Felix Vardy, John Morgan. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2007. 1 online resource (32 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot---which we model as forcing interest groups to contract on outcomes rather than votes---is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. We also study more sophisticated vote buying contracts. We show that, regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability as compared to contracting only on votes. In contrast, when interest groups can contract on votes and vote shares, we show that voting bodies are uniquely at risk of being bought. Mode of access: Internet Contract Lead imf Contracts Contingent imf Simple Majority imf Study Contract imf WP imf Taiwan Province of China imf Morgan, John. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2007/165 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/165/001.2007.issue-165-en.xml IMF e-Library