01758cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF009540 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451867831 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Faal, Ebrima. Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea / Ebrima Faal. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2007. 1 online resource (16 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent governments, mainly in the form of increased development spending and overall primary expenditure, followed in some cases by retrenchment in post-election periods. These findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. It is noteworthy that revenue was not statistically significantly related to elections, either in the pre- or post-election period. In this regard, electoral swings in fiscal deficits reflect a preference for influencing expenditures rather than taxation. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2007/219 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/219/001.2007.issue-219-en.xml IMF e-Library