01708cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF009840 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451869002 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Bi, Ran. 'Beneficial' Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations / Ran Bi. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008. 1 online resource (29 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Delays in debt restructuring negotiations are widely regarded as inefficient. This paper argues that delays can allow the economy to recover from a crisis, make more resources available for debt settlement, and enable the negotiating parties to enjoy a larger "cake". Within this context, therefore, delays may be "beneficial". This paper explores this idea by constructing a dynamic model of sovereign default in which debt renegotiation is modeled as a stochastic bargaining game based on Merlo and Wilson's (1995) framework. Quantitative analysis shows that this model can generate an average delay length comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent debt restructuring. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/038 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/038/001.2008.issue-038-en.xml IMF e-Library