01733cas a2200313 a 4500 AALejournalIMF009938 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848557 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kaufmann, Daniel. Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? / Daniel Kaufmann, Shang-Jin Wei. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (21 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In a general equilibrium in which bribe-extracting bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burden and delay, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery can be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm surveys, this paper finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Firms that pay more in bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats in negotiating regulations. They also face a higher, not lower, cost of capital. Mode of access: Internet Bribery Firm imf Firm imf Firms Face imf WP imf United States imf Wei, Shang-Jin. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/064 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/064/001.2000.issue-064-en.xml IMF e-Library