Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? /
In a general equilibrium in which bribe-extracting bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burden and delay, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery can be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm surveys, this paper finds evidence consistent with...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Kaufmann, Daniel |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | Wei, Shang-Jin |
| Μορφή: | Επιστημονικό περιοδικό |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Σειρά: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/064 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full text available on IMF |
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