01858cas a2200301 a 4500 AALejournalIMF009960 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451948004 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Debt Relief and Leveraged Buy-Outs. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1988. 1 online resource (6 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Analyses of debt relief that focus on the behavior of debtors and existing creditors understate the incentives for collective action by creditors. It is well known that debt relief could benefit existing creditors by providing incentives for domestic investment by residents of debtor countries. It is argued here that relief could also make available additional profit opportunities to international investors. Under these circumstances, arrangements that would allow international investors to capture economic profits would make a leveraged buy-out of existing creditors, followed by relief, a profitable strategy for any investor or group of investors that could act collectively. Mode of access: Internet Buy-Out Specialist imf Buy-Out imf Debtor Country imf Leveraged Buy-Out imf WP imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1988/103 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/103/001.1988.issue-103-en.xml IMF e-Library