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   <subfield code="z">9781451958942</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">1018-5941</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">International Monetary Fund.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Is Dept Relief in the Interests of Creditors?</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1">
   <subfield code="a">Washington, D.C. :</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">International Monetary Fund,</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">1988.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">1 online resource (22 pages)</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;Off-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;On-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="506" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">This paper considers a number of reasons-in addition to the 'incentives' argument-why debt relief could be to the advantage of creditors collectively. Principal reasons analyzed are based on the 'investment-capacity' and the 'default-forestalling' arguments. Debt relief is defined as reduction of the present value of the contractual debt. The paper thus provides an analytical basis for various debt relief proposals that do not require finance or guarantees from creditor governments and for the considerable amount of relief in the form of rescheduling and concerted lending that has already taken place. The free rider problem and the extent to which the market may overcome it is discussed.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Mode of access: Internet</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;</subfield>
   <subfield code="v">No. 1988/072</subfield>
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   <subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/072/001.1988.issue-072-en.xml</subfield>
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