01682cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF010082 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451968910 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1989. 1 online resource (34 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt repayment is equal to the trade surplus of the debtor. The outcome of the bargaining game will therefore be dependent (among other things) on the level of production in the debtor country. In this framework, the paper shows that productive investment may increase or decrease the bargaining power of the debtor country. This ambiguity appears to be fairly robust. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1989/055 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1989/055/001.1989.issue-055-en.xml IMF e-Library