01551cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF010114 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451977851 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Debt Relief and Adjustment Incentives : A Theoretical Exploration. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1988. 1 online resource (21 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The purpose of this paper is to analyze the argument that debt relief would increase the incentive of a debtor country to make an adjustment effort (to invest) and that for this reason creditors may benefit by granting relief. It is shown that there are actually opposing incentive effects of debt relief and that the argument could be valid in particular circumstances. A distinction is made between exogenous and endogenous relief, the latter compelled by low capacity to pay caused by low investment earlier. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1988/036 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/036/001.1988.issue-036-en.xml IMF e-Library