01761cas a2200289 a 4500 AALejournalIMF010115 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451978322 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Policy Inconsistency and External Debt Service. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1990. 1 online resource (16 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt-service payments reflects, in part, their inability to credibly and permanently suspend debt service. The benefits of a credible debt-service suspension would include increased private investment. But this would, in turn, tend to create conditions in which it would then be optimal for the government to resume payments. Thus, debt remains a threat even after the announcement of suspension of debt service. It follows that the expected benefits of such a suspension are limited and may be offset by penalties imposed by creditors. Mode of access: Internet Investment Equilibrium imf Investment imf Tax Rate imf WP imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1990/035 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1990/035/001.1990.issue-035-en.xml IMF e-Library