01759cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF010116 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451978254 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Multilateral Developing-Country Debt Rescheduling Negotiations : A Bargaining-Theoretic. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1988. 1 online resource (16 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper employs a dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework to analyze multilateral sovereign debt rescheduling negotiations. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor's gains from trade and the level of world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of various parties to a rescheduling agreement. If creditor-country taxpayers have a vested interest in maintaining normal levels of trade with debtor countries, then they can sometimes be bargained into making sidepayments. The benefits from unanticipated creditor-country sidepayments accrue to both lenders and borrowers. But the benefits from perfectly anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to borrowers. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1988/035 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/035/001.1988.issue-035-en.xml IMF e-Library