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   <subfield code="z">9781451979077</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">1018-5941</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">International Monetary Fund.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Does the SDR System Generate Permanent Resource Transfers?</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1">
   <subfield code="a">Washington, D.C. :</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">International Monetary Fund,</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">1988.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">1 online resource (30 pages)</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;Off-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;On-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">The paper analyzes whether the SDR system generates permanent resource transfers-i.e., transfers of resources that do not involve equivalent quid pro quos. It is argued that SDR allocation only gives rise to permanent resource transfers if the SDR interest rate is uncompetitive or if holding SDRs is perceived to be risky, and that the use of SDRs gives rise to permanent resource transfers only if the SDR interest rate is uncompetitive. These conclusions are reconciled with the fact that SDR allocation can provide reserves to many countries at terms more favorable than the costs of borrowing or earning reserves.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;</subfield>
   <subfield code="v">No. 1988/033</subfield>
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   <subfield code="z">Full text available on IMF</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/033/001.1988.issue-033-en.xml</subfield>
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