02035cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF010516 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 15.00 USD 9781451957068 1020-7635 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Research Dept. IMF Staff papers : Volume 42 No. 1. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1995. 1 online resource (244 pages) IMF Staff Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last twenty years rather than sooner? We begin by discussing the 'tax smoothing' model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize into six groups: (1) models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with 'fiscal illusion'; (2) models of intergenerational redistributions; (3) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (4) models of coalition governments; (5) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (6) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications. Mode of access: Internet IMF Staff Papers; IMF Staff Papers ; No. 1995/001 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/024/1995/001/024.1995.issue-001-en.xml IMF e-Library