Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government : Theory and Practice /
This paper examines central bank independence with reference to the constraints on central bank credit to the government, focusing on how such credit should be regulated. It discusses why credit should be contsrained, and in which forms, and how to implement those constraints.
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| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1993.
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| Series: | Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ;
No. 1993/008 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | This paper examines central bank independence with reference to the constraints on central bank credit to the government, focusing on how such credit should be regulated. It discusses why credit should be contsrained, and in which forms, and how to implement those constraints. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (62 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 0251-6365 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |