02080cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF012397 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 15.00 USD 9781557759481 0251-6365 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Garcia, G. Deposit Insurance : Actual and Good Practices / G. Garcia. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (98 pages) Occasional Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper demonstrates a well-designed deposit guarantee system can strengthen incentives for owners, managers, depositors and other creditors, borrowers, regulators and supervisors, and politicians. Borrowers should be aware that they will have to repay their loans if their bank fails and will be encouraged to keep their loans current where offsetting is limited to past-due loans. The performance of insurers, regulators, and supervisors as agents will improve where they know that they can take justifiable actions without political interference and will be held accountable for their actions to their principals. Despite the improvements, and possibly partly because there are issues in deposit insurance design that remain to be resolved, financial crises have been prevalent during the 1990s. This situation has forced a number of countries to offer a blanket guarantee to restore confidence and to allow the continued functioning of the financial system while the authorities take time to design a plan for the resolution of the crisis. Mode of access: Internet Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ; No. 2000/001 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/books/084/01664-9781557759481-en/01664-9781557759481-en-book.xml IMF e-Library