01517cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF012693 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781589061446 1020-8399 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Phillips, Steven. Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? Chinese Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? / Steven Phillips, Timothy Lane. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003. 1 online resource (24 pages) Economic Issues <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be. Mode of access: Internet Lane, Timothy. Economic Issues; Economic Issues ; No. 2002/003 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/books/051/04762-9781589061446-zh/04762-9781589061446-zh-book.xml IMF e-Library