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   <subfield code="a">1020-5098</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">International Monetary Fund.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Roads to Nowhere : </subfield>
   <subfield code="b">How Corruption in Public investment Hurts Growth.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Washington, D.C. :</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">International Monetary Fund,</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">1998.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">1 online resource (15 pages)</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Economic Issues</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;Off-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">&lt;strong&gt;On-Campus Access:&lt;/strong&gt; No User ID or Password Required</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">In some countries, corrupt politicians appear to choose investment projects based on the opportunity for bribes and kickbacks these projectspresent. This paper contends that such corruption increases the numberof capital projects undertaken and trends to enlarge their size andcomplexity. The result is that, paradoxically, some public investmentcan end up reducing a country's growth.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="538" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Mode of access: Internet</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Economic Issues; Economic Issues ;</subfield>
   <subfield code="v">No. 1998/001</subfield>
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