01807cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF013316 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781616356774 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ratnovski, Lev. Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management / Lev Ratnovski. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2013/016 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2013/016/001.2013.issue-016-en.xml IMF e-Library