Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises /

That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater ta...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mooij, Ruud A.
Other Authors: Keen, Michael, Orihara, Masanori
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2013/048
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
Description
Summary:That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises much more likely, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial-far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest.
Item Description:<strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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Physical Description:1 online resource (26 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Access:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students