01633cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF013406 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781475566055 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Keen, Michael. Targeting, Cascading, and Indirect Tax Design / Michael Keen. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013. 1 online resource (29 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper addresses two fundamental issues in indirect tax design. It first revisits the case for reduced rates on items especially important to the poor, establishing conditions under which even very crudely targeted spending measures better serve their interests. It then explores the welfare costs from cascading taxes, showing that these may actually be lower the wider the set of inputs that are taxed but, more to the point-and contrary to the common notion that 'a low rate on a broad base' is always good tax policy-may plausibly be large even at a low nominal tax rate and with few stages of production. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2013/057 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2013/057/001.2013.issue-057-en.xml IMF e-Library