01590cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF013765 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781484354100 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Hardy, Daniel. Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance / Daniel Hardy. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Depositor preference and collateralization of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy. This net benefit, which may be capitalized into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors' expected returns, should result in lower overall funding costs and thus a lower probability of distress despite increasing encumbrance of the bank's balance sheet. The benefit is maximized when resolution is initiated early enough for preferred depositors to remain fully protected. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2013/172 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2013/172/001.2013.issue-172-en.xml IMF e-Library