02046cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF015565 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781513569246 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Sandri, Damiano. Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises : Fiscal Consolidation, Bail-ins or Official Transfers? / Damiano Sandri. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2015. 1 online resource (43 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers. Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis-resolution framework that ensures commitment. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2015/223 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/223/001.2015.issue-223-en.xml IMF e-Library