02104cas a2200277 a 4500 AALejournalIMF016069 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781513521534 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chen, Chuling. Political Costs of Tax-Based Consolidations / Chuling Chen, Era Dabla-Norris, Jay Rappaport, Aleksandra Zdzienicka. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019. 1 online resource (31 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government's term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems. Mode of access: Internet Dabla-Norris, Era. Rappaport, Jay. Zdzienicka, Aleksandra. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/298 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/298/001.2019.issue-298-en.xml IMF e-Library