02147cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF016122 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781513524054 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Bossu, Wouter. The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance : Key Legal Design Issues / Wouter Bossu, Arthur D. P. Rossi. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019. 1 online resource (71 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks-a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank-the Oversight Board-ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership's 174 central banks with staff's advisory practice developed over the past 50 years. Mode of access: Internet Rossi, Arthur D. P. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/293 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/293/001.2019.issue-293-en.xml IMF e-Library