01823cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF016701 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781513596648 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Asonuma, Tamon. Serial Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings / Tamon Asonuma. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016. 1 online resource (45 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper explains these stylized facts within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults. The model also accords with an additional fact: lower recovery rates (high NPV haircuts) are associated with increases in spreads at renegotiation. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/066 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/066/001.2016.issue-066-en.xml IMF e-Library