01878cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF016754 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781484322031 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kotia, Ananya. Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? : New Empirical Evidence from Europe / Ananya Kotia, Victor Lledo. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016. 1 online resource (37 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large 'vertical fiscal imbalances' that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline. Mode of access: Internet Lledo, Victor. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/084 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/084/001.2016.issue-084-en.xml IMF e-Library