01962cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF017053 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781475529845 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Escolano, Julio. Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk / Julio Escolano, Vitor Gaspar. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016. 1 online resource (21 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In the paper we show that, most of the time, smooth reduction in the debt ratio is optimal for tax-smoothing purposes when fiscal risks are asymmetric, with large debt-augmenting shocks more likely than commensurate debt reducing shocks. Asymmetric risks are a feature of 200 years of data for the U.S. and the U.K.: rare but recurrent large surges of the debt-to-GDP ratio, followed by very gradual but persistent declines over long periods. More informal evidence from many other countries suggests that asymmetry is a general feature of fiscal shocks. The gradual smooth reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio is not a response to past developments. Instead it is optimal given recurrent fiscal risks and the empirical characteristics of fiscal shocks. The behavior of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.K. and the U.S. seems roughly compatible with the prescriptions of the tax-smoothing model. Mode of access: Internet Gaspar, Vitor. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/178 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/178/001.2016.issue-178-en.xml IMF e-Library