01826cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF017118 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781475536751 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Carletti, Elena. Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union / Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016. 1 online resource (50 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors if their objective functions differ. Information collection may be inferior to that under fully independent local supervisors or under centralized information collection. And this may increase risk-taking by regulated banks. Yet, a 'tougher' central supervisor may increase regulatory standards. Thus, the net effect of centralization on bank risk taking depends on the balance of these two effects. Mode of access: Internet Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. Marquez, Robert. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/186 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/186/001.2016.issue-186-en.xml IMF e-Library