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   <subfield code="a">Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Debt Crisis and Management /</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">Cristiano Cantore, Paul Levine, Giovanni Melina, Joseph Pearlman.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Washington, D.C. :</subfield>
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   <subfield code="c">2017.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government's commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with 'normal shocks', perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds-under commitment-the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Levine, Paul.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Melina, Giovanni.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;</subfield>
   <subfield code="v">No. 2017/078</subfield>
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