01990cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF017649 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781484300640 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Tanner, Evan. Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence : Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic / Evan Tanner. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017. 1 online resource (34 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the policy challenges a country faces when it wants to both reduce inflation and maintain a sustainable external position. Mundell's (1962) policy assignment framework suggests that these two goals may be mutually incompatible unless monetary and fiscal policies are properly coordinated. Unfortunately, if the fiscal authority is unwilling to cooperate-a case of fiscal intransigence-central banks that pursue a disinflation on a 'go it alone' basis will cause the country's external position to further deteriorate. A dynamic analysis shows that if the central bank itself lacks credibility in its inflation goal, it must rely even more on cooperation from the fiscal authority than otherwise. Echoing Sargent and Wallace's (1981) 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,' in these circumstances, a 'go it alone' policy may successfully stabilize prices and output, but only on a short-term basis. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/118 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/118/001.2017.issue-118-en.xml IMF e-Library