01997cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF018354 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781484347546 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Igan, Deniz. Bank Lobbying : Regulatory Capture and Beyond / Deniz Igan, Thomas Lambert. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019. 1 online resource (30 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks. Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions as well as strenghtened checks and balances within the decision-making process would go in this direction. Mode of access: Internet Lambert, Thomas. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/171 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/171/001.2019.issue-171-en.xml IMF e-Library