01709cas a2200337 a 4500 AALejournalIMF018820 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781484381175 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Morgan, John. The Limits of Meritocracy / John Morgan, Justin Tumlinson, Felix Vardy. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2018. 1 online resource (87 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. Mode of access: Internet Aggregate Output imf Efficiency imf Level Playing Field imf Meritocracy imf WP imf Netherlands, The imf Tumlinson, Justin. Vardy, Felix. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2018/231 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2018/231/001.2018.issue-231-en.xml IMF e-Library