02328cas a2200349 a 4500 AALejournalIMF019329 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781498315241 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Agca, Senay. Doing More for Less? : New Evidence on Lobbying and Government Contracts / Senay Agca, Deniz Igan, Fuhong Li, Prachi Mishra. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019. 1 online resource (47 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Why do firms lobby? This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 that reduced the availability of government funds disbursed through procurement contracts to shed light on this question. Following this event, firms with little or no prior exposure to the federal accounts that experienced cuts reduced their lobbying spending. In contrast, firms with a high degree of exposure to the cuts maintained and even increased their lobbying spending. This suggests that, when the same number of contractors competed for a piece of a reduced pie, the more affected firms likely intensified their lobbying efforts to distinguish themselves from the others and improve their chances of procuring a larger share of the smaller overall. These findings are stronger in government-dependent sectors and when there is intense competition. The evidence is more consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for lobbying. Mode of access: Internet Firm Level imf Level Competition imf Natural Logarithm imf Sequestered Firm imf WP imf United States imf Igan, Deniz. Li, Fuhong. Mishra, Prachi. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/172 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/172/001.2019.issue-172-en.xml IMF e-Library