01814cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF021003 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781513546049 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Bosshardt, Joshua. Why Did Public Banks Lend More During the Global Financial Crisis? / Joshua Bosshardt, Eugenio Cerutti. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2020. 1 online resource (36 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), state-owned or public banks lent relatively more than domestic private banks in many countries. However, data limitations have hindered a thorough assessment of what led public banks to better maintain lending during the GFC. Using a novel bank-level dataset covering 25 emerging market economies, we show that public banks lent relatively more during the GFC because they pursued an objective of helping to stabilize the economy, rather than because they had superior fundamentals or access to public or depositors' funding. Nonetheless, their countercyclical behavior seems unique to the GFC rather than a regular characteristic of public banks before and after the GFC. Mode of access: Internet Cerutti, Eugenio. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2020/084 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/084/001.2020.issue-084-en.xml IMF e-Library