01846cas a2200301 a 4500 AALejournalIMF021677 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 18.00 USD 9781513582313 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Capelle, Damien. Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk / Damien Capelle. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2021. 1 online resource (74 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect. Mode of access: Internet Foreign Exchange imf Inflation imf Informal Economy imf Price Level imf Underground Econom imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2021/102 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2021/102/001.2021.issue-102-en.xml IMF e-Library