01954cas a2200325 a 4500 AALejournalIMF022498 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9798400202346 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Alvero, Adrien. Watch What They Do, Not What They Say : Estimating Regulatory Costs from Revealed Preferences / Adrien Alvero, Sakai Ando, Kairong Xiao. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2022. 1 online resource (89 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in the size distribution of banks reveals the magnitude of regulatory costs. Using U.S. bank data, we estimate the regulatory costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the estimated regulatory costs are substantial, they are significatnly lower than those in self-reported estimates by banks. Mode of access: Internet Banks imf Depository Institutions imf Financial Institutions and Services imf Micro Finance Institutions imf Mortgages imf Ando, Sakai. Xiao, Kairong. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2022/041 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2022/041/001.2022.issue-041-en.xml IMF e-Library