01989cas a2200313 a 4500 AALejournalIMF022594 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9798400204036 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL An, Zhiyong. Social Versus Individual Work Preferences : Implications for Optimal Income Taxation / Zhiyong An, David Coady. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2022. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The benchmark optimal income taxation model of Mirrlees (1971) finds that the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) is always non-negative. A key model assumption is the coincidence between social and individual work preferences. This paper extends the model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that under this model, when the government places a higher social weight on work than individuals, the optimal MIT schedule is shifted downwards, introducing the possibility for optimal wage subsidies at the bottom of the income distribution. This implies lower revenues, demogrants, and overall progressivity. Mode of access: Internet Distribution imf Economics imf Macroeconomics imf Preference Differences imf Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue imf Coady, David. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2022/062 Full text available on IMF https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2022&issue=062 IMF e-Library