02043cas a2200277 a 4500 AALejournalIMF022842 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 20.00 USD 9781451875201 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chami, Ralph. A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement / Ralph Chami, Ilhyock Shim, Sunil Sharma. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (44 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The paper shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and integrating into the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts offered by the IMF. The analysis suggests that, if the IMF's objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives-induce higher effort by member countries to avoid and overcome crises-than an ex-post loan contract. Such ex ante contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan's dilemma and time inconsistency. The paper also shows that state-contingent repayment schemes are needed to deal with King Lear's dilemma. Mode of access: Internet Asymmetric and Private Information imf Sharma, Sunil.. Shim, Ilhyock. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/219 Full text available on IMF https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2004&issue=219 IMF e-Library