02209cas a2200325 a 4500 AALejournalIMF022908 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 20.00 USD 9798400210075 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ehrmann, Michael. Voting Right Rotation, Behavior of Committee Members and Financial Market Reactions : Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee / Michael Ehrmann, Robin Tietz, Bauke Visser. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2022. 1 online resource (44 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Which Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: nonvoting presidents do attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. We test two hypotheses about the dependence of presidents' behavior on voting status. (i) Loss compensation: presidents compensate the loss of the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. (ii) Motivation: presidents complement the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. The evidence favors the motivation hypothesis. Also, in years that presidents vote, their speeches move financial markets less than in years they do not vote. We argue that this vote discount is consistent with presidents' communication behavior. Mode of access: Internet Associations imf Clubs imf Committees imf Models of Political Processes imf Social Choice imf Tietz, Robin. Visser, Bauke.. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2022/105 Full text available on IMF https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2022&issue=105 IMF e-Library