Central Bank Independence : A Free Lunch? /
This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objec...
| 第一著者: | Debelle, Guy |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1996.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1996/001 |
| オンライン・アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
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