Market Information and Signaling in Central Bank Operations, or, How Often Should a Central Bank Intervene?
A central bank must decide on the frequency with which it will conduct open market operations and the variability in short-term money market that it will allow. It is shown how the optimal operating procedure balances the value of attaining an immediate target and broadcasting the central bank'...
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| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1997.
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| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1997/028 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
| Sumari: | A central bank must decide on the frequency with which it will conduct open market operations and the variability in short-term money market that it will allow. It is shown how the optimal operating procedure balances the value of attaining an immediate target and broadcasting the central bank's intentions against the informational advantages to the central bank of allowing the free play of market forces to reveal more of the information available to market participants. |
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| Descripció de l’ítem: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descripció física: | 1 online resource (28 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Accés: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |