Fiscal Policy and the Predictability of Exchange Rate Collapse /
It is well known that the long-run viability of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes constraints on monetary policy. This paper shows that, in a model with forward-looking agents, short-run viability imposes a fiscal constraint. When policy change, which destroys long-run viability, also violates th...
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| Aineistotyyppi: | Aikakauslehti |
| Kieli: | English |
| Julkaistu: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1997.
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| Sarja: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1997/133 |
| Linkit: | Full text available on IMF |
| Yhteenveto: | It is well known that the long-run viability of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes constraints on monetary policy. This paper shows that, in a model with forward-looking agents, short-run viability imposes a fiscal constraint. When policy change, which destroys long-run viability, also violates the fiscal constraint, collapse is instantaneous. Delayed predictable collapse requires satisfaction of the fiscal constraint. |
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| Huomautukset: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Ulkoasu: | 1 online resource (18 pages) |
| Aineistotyyppi: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Pääsy: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |