Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...
| 第一著者: | Levy Yeyati, Eduardo |
|---|---|
| その他の著者: | Cordella, Tito |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/106 |
| オンライン・アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
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