Global Financial Crises : Institutions and Incentives /
Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor's moral hazard, there i...
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| Другие авторы: | , |
| Формат: | Журнал |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
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| Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/105 |
| Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |
| Итог: | Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor's moral hazard, there is the risk of self-fulfilling crises. In this context, we conclude that the proposal of the Meltzer Commission-for unconditional financial support, but only to states that pre-qualify-could be the source of increased instability. After discussing analogies with private sector arrangements, we compare the operations of the existing Paris Club with proposed Chapter 11 style procedures. |
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| Примечание: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Объем: | 1 online resource (25 pages) |
| Формат: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Доступ: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |