Costly Collateral and the Public Supply of Liquidity /
This paper addresses two complications arising from the use of collateral requirements in debt contracts between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and banks. First, costly asset liquidation is found to enhance the susceptibility of debt finance to interest rate volatility. Second, aggregate uncertain...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Periódico |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
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| coleção: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/125 |
| Acesso em linha: | Full text available on IMF |
| Resumo: | This paper addresses two complications arising from the use of collateral requirements in debt contracts between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and banks. First, costly asset liquidation is found to enhance the susceptibility of debt finance to interest rate volatility. Second, aggregate uncertainty in conjunction with limited bank capitalization is shown to produce excessive credit constraints that, under certain conditions, justify the public supply of liquidity. The paper suggests applications with respect to models of interest rate smoothing and self-fulfilling currency crises. |
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| Descrição do item: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrição Física: | 1 online resource (24 pages) |
| Formato: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Acesso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |