Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail /
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While...
| Hlavní autor: | Kaufman, George |
|---|---|
| Další autoři: | Seelig, Steven |
| Médium: | Časopis |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydáno: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Edice: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/083 |
| On-line přístup: | Full text available on IMF |
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