Resources and Incentives to Reform : A Model and Some Evidence on Sub-Saharan African Countries /
The paper models the incentives for a self-interested government to implement "good policies". While good policies lead to investment and growth, they reduce the government's ability to increase supporters' consumption. The model predicts that resource abundance is conductive to...
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| Kolejni autorzy: | |
| Format: | Czasopismo |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
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| Seria: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/086 |
| Dostęp online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Streszczenie: | The paper models the incentives for a self-interested government to implement "good policies". While good policies lead to investment and growth, they reduce the government's ability to increase supporters' consumption. The model predicts that resource abundance is conductive to poor policies and, consequently, to low investment. The implications of the model are broadly supported by evidence on sub-Saharan African countries. In particular, countries that are rich in natural resources tend to have lower institutional quality and worse macroeconomic and trade policies. |
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| Deskrypcja: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Opis fizyczny: | 1 online resource (43 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Ograniczenie dostępu: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |