Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? /
Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increas...
| Главный автор: | Becker, Torbjorn |
|---|---|
| Другие авторы: | Richards, Anthony, Thaicharoen, Yunyong |
| Формат: | Журнал |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/092 |
| Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |
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