Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? : Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending /
During the 1990s, the concept of "catalytic official finance" (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its "seal of approval"-backed up by only limited off...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
|
| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/193 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | During the 1990s, the concept of "catalytic official finance" (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its "seal of approval"-backed up by only limited official financing-on the country's economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors; on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises. |
|---|---|
| উপাদানের বিবরণ: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 1 online resource (50 pages) |
| বিন্যাস: | Mode of access: Internet |
| আইএসএসএন: | 1018-5941 |
| প্রবেশাধিকার: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |